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Data-centric technologies are transforming criminal justice in the United 
States.  These systems and techniques are usually designed to accomplish one or 
more of the following goals: to better collect criminal justice information via 
devices like body cameras or acoustic gunshot sensors; to audit the effectiveness 
and constitutionality of historical practices; and to improve decision-making 
processes like pretrial detention determinations by judges or officer deployments 
by police departments.  These uses of “big data” and associated algorithmic 
procedures offer the promise of increased accountability, efficiency, and 
equitability.  They also raise legal concerns that are inadequately addressed by 
existing jurisprudence, and policy concerns associated with current and planned 
criminal justice processes.  This paper examines these concerns in the context of 
the investigative stop, during which a police officer briefly detains a criminal 
suspect—and may perform a limited search, or frisk, of the suspect’s outer 
garments—and statistical tests for racial discrimination in programs of these 
stops.1  One of these tests is described in detail, and then two broad questions are 
raised regarding how statistical tests for racial discrimination can be implemented 
and supported in practice.2 
The main Supreme Court ruling concerning the police stop is Terry v. Ohio, 
which clarified that a standard of “reasonable suspicion” of criminality is required 
for a stop to be made, and that reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and 
dangerous is additionally required for the frisk.3  Although extensively used,4 
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1   This article considers both pedestrian and vehicle stops, and will refer to them 
interchangeably as investigative stops, Terry stops, or the more colloquial “stop-and-frisk.” 
2   For a more comprehensive treatments of these ideas, see Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao & 
Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-
Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365 (2016) [hereinafter Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?]; 
Sharad Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police 
Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181 (2017) [hereinafter Goel et al., 
Combatting Police Discrimination]. 
3   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
4   Between 2014 and 2015, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) carried out over 1.3 million 
stops, ARLANDER KEYS, THE CONSULTANT’S FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATORY STOP 
AND PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2016 – JUNE 30, 2016, at 20–21 
(2017), and between 2008 and 2012, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) carried out 
almost 3 million stops, Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/
en/stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/63ZQ-RBHE]. More recently, the NYPD has dramatically 
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programs of police stops remain controversial.  Proponents claim that stop-and-
frisk is an effective tool in interrupting and deterring criminal activity, because it is 
not subject to the more stringent standard of probable cause that governs arrests 
and searches.5  Critics, however, argue that programs of police stops impose 
burdens on those detained, and do not efficiently accomplish the goal of getting 
weapons and drugs off the streets.6  Moreover, they argue that stops are frequently 
conducted without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
and that stop-and-frisk policies have been implemented in a racially discriminatory 
manner, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7  Although this paper focuses on Equal Protection violations, it 
should be noted that general crime deterrence by itself is not an adequate legal 
justification for performing a Terry stop, and that the evidence for deterrence 
effects of stop-and-frisk is mixed.8 
A number of powerful statistical tests have been used within the last decade to 
determine the presence of racial bias in Terry stops (these tests can also be used to 
test for bias toward other protected classes).  In a benchmark test, the racial 
distribution of stopped Terry suspects is compared to a known benchmark 
distribution, such as the racial composition of the local residential population, or of 
local arrestees for violent crimes the previous year.  Differences between the 
distribution of Terry suspects and the benchmark can suggest racial bias.9  
However, the plausibility of these benchmark tests often depends on strong 
assumptions about the benchmark distribution, e.g., that the racial composition of 
the local residential population mirrors the racial composition of those exhibiting 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop.  Another class of outcome 
tests compares contraband recovery rates by race.  If a lower proportion of black 
stops motivated by suspected weapon possession in fact recover a weapon—
compared to the proportion of similarly motivated white stops that recover a 
weapon—this suggests that a lower standard of evidence was used by officers 
                                                                                                                                                      
curtailed the use of stop-and-frisk; fewer than 13,000 stops were conducted city-wide in 2016.  See 
N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra. 
5   See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Raymond Kelly, Ex-Police Commissioner, Blames Mayor de Blasio 
for Rise in Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/nyregion/
raymond-kelly-ex-police-commissioner-blames-mayor-de-blasio-for-rise-in-killings.html [https://per
ma.cc/L33Z-B23B]. 
6   See, e.g., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 4. 
7   See id. 
8   See generally Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the 
Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5 (2017). 
9   Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police 
Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 813, 816–20 (2007); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 583–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
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when stopping black suspects versus white suspects.10  Other tests compare the 
racial distribution of drivers stopped after dark (when race is hard to observe) to 
drivers stopped during daylight hours,11 or use information about the race of the 
officer conducting the stop.12 
A type of outcome test sometimes referred to as “stop-level hit rate” (SHR) 
analysis can be used to assess discrimination in stops.13  A SHR test uses a 
statistical model to measure the degree of suspicion motivating a stop.  
Specifically, the model uses all recorded information available to an officer at the 
time a stop is made to estimate the chance that the stop will be “successful.”  This 
estimate is the stop-level hit rate.  Since stops must be motivated by reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, “success” might mean that a stop of an 
individual suspected to be carrying a weapon in fact recovers a weapon.14  In the 
study conducted in Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding Racial Disparities in 
New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, the authors applied SHR analysis to New 
York City’s stop-and-frisk data by fitting a logistic regression model to the half-
million stops from 2008 to 2010 that were motivated by suspected criminal 
possession of a weapon (CPW).15  This model included variables measuring 
recorded values of, among other things, the suspect’s demographics (e.g., age and 
gender), reasons cited by the officer for the stop (e.g., “suspicious bulge”), and 
location information (e.g., police precinct), and estimated the likelihood that the 
stop would uncover a weapon.  The model was found to be accurate, gave 
                                                                                                                                      
10  Outcome tests suffer from known issues with infra-marginality and subgroup validity.  Ian 
Ayres, Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 131, 135–41 
(2002).  However, a more powerful “threshold test” has recently been devised that circumvents these 
issues; this threshold test was applied to stop-and-frisk data from New York City, and found evidence 
of bias.  See Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of Infra-Marginality 
in Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1193 (2017); Emma Pierson, Sam 
Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, Fast Threshold Tests for Detecting Discrimination (Stanford Univ., 
Working Paper arXiv:1702.08536v2 [stat.ML], 2018). 
11  See, e.g., Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops 
from Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 878 (2006); Emma Pierson et al., A Large-
Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States (Stanford Univ., 
Working Paper arXiv:1706.05678v1 [stat.AP], 2017). 
12  See, e.g., Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence 
from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163 (2009); Shamena Anwar & 
Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and 
Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (2006). 
13  The numerical estimates provided by SHR analysis can also inform assessments of Fourth 
Amendment violations and improve Terry stop policies.  See Goel et al., Combatting Police 
Discrimination, supra note 2, at 211–20. 
14  Success could also mean that a stop predicated on the suspicion of drug possession in fact 
recovers drugs, or that any stop results in an arrest.  However, the validity of these tests can suffer 
when the outcome is subject to human bias (e.g., there is arguably more officer discretion involved in 
the outcome of arrest, compared to the outcome of weapon recovery). 
15  Goel et al., Precinct or Prejudice?, supra note 2, at 368–74. 
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calibrated estimates, and was robust to reasonable errors in the measurement of 
values like age, weight, and height. 
Given stop-level hit rates, one can then analyze how they vary by the 
suspect’s race.  In the analysis cited above, although approximately 50% of black 
CPW stops had an estimated hit rate of less than 1%, only approximately 20% of 
white CPW stops had a similarly low hit rate.16  Thus, these low hit rate stops 
disproportionately affected black individuals compared to white individuals.  
Moreover, SHR tests can be used to understand whether differences in race-
specific hit rate distributions arise for race-neutral reasons.  For example, if 
officers have a lower threshold of suspicion (which is what a stop-level hit rate is 
estimating) for conducting stops in high crime areas, and high crime areas happen 
to be areas with a high proportion of minorities, this might explain differences in 
race-specific hit rate distributions absent discriminatory decisions by individual 
officers.  However, when hit rates by race were examined within each location, 
disparities persisted.17  Therefore, SHR analysis can yield evidence to reject non-
discriminatory explanations for racial disparities, and provide support for the claim 
that stop-and-frisk in New York City was discriminatory toward black individuals.  
Stop-level hit rates can also inform policy by identifying types of stops that are 
both unlikely to recover contraband, and which also impose a disproportionate 
burden on a protected class. 
The accuracy and value of statistical tests for discrimination in programs of 
Terry stops depends on the existence of detailed and comprehensive data that 
records important aspects of these stops.  Fortunately, many police departments are 
now systematically collecting such data,18 either as a result of settlements or 
injunctions, or a desire to improve their practices and accountability.  Furthermore, 
these data are now being organized and made available through additional efforts 
by nonprofit organizations like the New York Civil Liberties Union,19 or academic 
collaborations like the Stanford Open Policing Project.20  However, important 
characteristics of stops are unavailable in many jurisdictions: only twelve of fifty 
states have provided the Stanford Open Policing Project with the required 
information to conduct outcome tests for search decisions (as of September 
2017).21  Moreover, characteristics of stops that are available in data are recorded 
                                                                                                                                      
16  Id. at 375. 
17  Id. at 377–78. 
18  For example, the NYPD annually releases an electronic dataset of stops.  Stop, Question 
and Frisk Data, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/stopfrisk.
page [https://perma.cc/T4F2-TMKU] (last visited Mar. 10, 2018). 
19  See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011: NYCLU BRIEFING (2012), 
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stop-and-Frisk_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LX4G-X8LE]. 
20  See STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc
/9MSP-8DC9] (last visited Mar. 10, 2018); see also Pierson et al., supra note 11. 
21  See STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT, supra note 20. 
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in many different ways.  Chicago’s investigatory stop report (ISR) form requires 
the officer to record the stop reason using seven checkboxes (e.g., “actions 
indicative of engaging in drug transaction”) and a free-text narrative section, 
whereas New York’s analogous UF-250 form provides 20 checkboxes (e.g., 
“proximity to crime location”) and a description of the suspected crime to describe 
the stop reason.22  Also, until recently, the CPD only collected information on 
stops which did not result in further enforcement action, whereas the NYPD—in 
theory, at least—collects information on every stop that an officer conducts.23  
These inconsistencies across cities limit the utility of the statistical methods 
described above in making clear and meaningful inferences about the presence of 
racial bias in stop-and-frisk. 
Beyond data issues, it has historically been challenging to use statistical tests 
to support a legal argument demonstrating Equal Protection violations in criminal 
justice contexts.  These claims are generally difficult to make because of the “two-
pronged test” introduced in Washington v. Davis,24 requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate both the disparate impact of an action on a protected class,25 as well as 
discriminatory intent, i.e., differences in treatment intentionally directed at 
members of that protected class.  While statistical tests have been used to show 
disparate impact, finding evidence of discriminatory intent is much more difficult.  
One reason for this is the Supreme Court ruling in McClesky v. Kemp,26 where 
statistical evidence showing that blacks who killed whites were more than seven 
times as likely to be sentenced to death as whites who killed blacks was not 
considered “stark” enough to infer a finding of discriminatory intent in the 
particular sentence of the defendant.27  Lower courts have also been hostile to the 
use of statistical evidence from outcome tests to infer discriminatory intent, and 
have rejected benchmark tests because of the use of unconvincing benchmarks.28  
However, these tests were often rejected due to data quality and 
comprehensiveness issues, rather than problems with the theoretical foundations of 
                                                                                                                                      
22  See Chicago Police Dep’t, Investigatory Stop Report CPD-11.910 (Rev. 7/17); N.Y. Police 
Dep’t, Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet PD344-151A (Rev. 11-02). 
23  The CPD’s ISR form has recently changed, and the NYPD’s UF-250 may also be amended 
to change the type of data collected and the format in which data are recorded.  See Rocco 
Parascandola, Stop-and-Frisk Forms Would Require More Details from NYPD, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/stop-and-frisk-forms-require-
details-nypd-article-1.2574886 [https://perma.cc/D7WF-PZ6Z]; ACLU OF ILL., MARCH 2017 STOP & 
FRISK REPORT (2017), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/publications/march-2017-stop-frisk-report [https://
perma.cc/3BFV-UF7B] (providing a comprehensive report on the CPD’s stop practices). 
24  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
25  In the context of Terry stops, this could mean showing that similarly situated defendants of 
a different race were not stopped, or that similarly situated stopped defendants of a different race 
were not frisked. 
26  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
27  Id. at 293. 
28  Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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the tests themselves.  Note that from a policy perspective, disparate impact is 
important beyond its use in inferring discriminatory intent.  It is bad policy to place 
extra burdens on historically disadvantaged communities, although this may be 
unavoidable depending on circumstance.  Also, in the seminal stop-and-frisk case, 
Floyd v. City of New York, a federal judge used some statistical evidence to support 
her finding of a violation of the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights (in 
particular, a benchmark test, to show disparate impact), but still relied upon 
explicit statements made by NYPD employees in verifying discriminatory intent.29 
Given the current and historical difficulties with using statistical methods to 
provide evidence for discrimination in programs of investigative stops, I raise and 
briefly discuss two questions aimed at addressing these issues. 
First, how can the use of statistical tests for discrimination be effectively 
standardized and made routine to audit and improve police actions?  One 
obstacle to this routinization is that police and the judiciary may believe that the 
stop-level hit rates generated by a statistical model are inaccurate.  However, if a 
model does not have the necessary information to generate accurate estimates, it is 
the responsibility of the police department to collect more and better data.30  
Another difficulty lies in determining whether a difference in hit rates by race is 
sufficiently large as to provide convincing evidence of discrimination.  For 
example, if a SHR analysis shows that within each location, black CPW stops have 
a hit rate of 3%, while white CPW stops have a hit rate of 4%, is this difference 
evidence of discrimination?  What if the white hit rate were 10%?  Similarly, in a 
benchmark test, who will determine if differences between the racial distribution of 
stopped Terry suspects and a chosen benchmark distribution are meaningful?  
Furthermore, given a convincing statistical analysis suggesting discriminatory 
policing (e.g., large within-location racial disparities demonstrated by a rigorous 
SHR analysis), should the burden shift to law enforcement to provide a race-
neutral justification?  Although burden-shifting occurs in other contexts, like Title 
VII law, the Supreme Court implied in Wayte v. United States that discriminatory 
intent requires more than simply being aware of the disparate impact resulting 
from a policy.31 
The second question is, how should data collection and recording 
procedures be improved and standardized to ensure that statistical tests for 
discrimination are actually effective?  The first criterion for effectiveness should 
be that tests give accurate results (e.g., data collection should not be skewed in 
some systematic way).  Second, these tests should be able to directly inform 
policy, so data collection procedures should be prioritized if they enable tests 
                                                                                                                                      
29  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
30  Even given extensive, detailed, and accurate data, statistical estimates may still be 
inaccurate if the model itself is misspecified.  However, this can be addressed in practice by using a 
sufficiently flexible model. 
31  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
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which have immediate implications for ongoing police practice.  These tests should 
be amenable to cross-jurisdictional comparison where possible, meaning that 
collection standards should be reasonably uniform across cities, counties, and 
states.  Moreover, data collection procedures should be flexible and have enough 
foresight to adapt to changing circumstances.  A specific example of these 
changing circumstances is the growing number of multiracial individuals in the 
United States; current data collection procedures usually only record one race for a 
stopped suspect.  However, collecting more data introduces costs associated with 
storing, searching, and releasing this information (e.g., sensitive data may require 
substantial redaction before public release).  Additionally, if more detailed 
information is kept on those who are stopped, and if those who are stopped are 
more likely to be disadvantaged or from a minority group, then burdens associated 
with privacy violations will fall more heavily on these minority groups.32  
Moreover, recording data free from error is difficult, although some scholarly work 
has introduced potential institutional and legislative solutions to minimize the 
occurrence of errors in criminal justice databases.33 
Answers to these two questions will require understanding Terry stops as 
programmatic, not isolated occurrences.  By thinking about stop-and-frisk as a 
program, courts may be more likely to allow the type of statistical evidence which 
requires large amounts of data.  Beyond using existing corpora of data to audit 
police actions, a broader goal should be to conduct post-hoc evaluations of all 
substantive uses of technology-related policy initiatives.  However, at the very 
least, researchers, police departments, and the judiciary should use statistical 
techniques like SHR analysis to produce evidence-based practices in order to make 
a more efficient and equitable criminal justice system. 
                                                                                                                                      
32  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 327 (2015) (exploring risks associated with collecting large quantities of criminal justice 
data). 
33  See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 596–611 (2016). 
